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Serious Prejudice: The Decline and Fall of
Agricultural Subsidies After the World
Trade Organization's Upland Cotton
Decision
Jason G. Buhi*
I. Introduction
A clandestine war is raging. Behind the newspaper headlines,
overshadowed by conflicts with Iraqi insurgents, Far-Eastern dictators,
and social security reform, America is engaged in another struggle for
security. The conflict is real: the victims are civilians; the casualties are
jobs. The developing world has declared economic warfare against the
United States. In a recent battle, a foreign organization struck a serious
blow to heartland America.
In United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,' the full
adjudicatory force of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO)
was unleashed against agricultural subsidies for the first time. The
Republic of Brazil won a WTO Panel decision stating that U.S.
government farm support programs compel upland cotton 2
overproduction, thereby driving down world cotton prices and disrupting
market access for Brazilian producers. The U.S. is currently appealing
the decision, 3 which could result in billion dollar trade sanctions. If
extended to other subsidized commodities like wheat, corn and soybeans,
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law,
2006; B.S., Political Science, Shepherd College, 2003. The author wishes to thank
Professor John Knox for his tutelage and thoughtful suggestions, and Jeanette Jaeggi,
Esq., for her example and support.
1. U.S.-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Aug. 9, 2004, WT/DS267/17 [hereinafter
Cotton].
2. Upland cotton is a specific genus of cotton, Gossypium hirsutum. Hereinafter, it
will simply be referred to as "cotton." For the precise characteristics of upland cotton,
see Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.197.
3. The WTO Appellate Body announced an extended period of review for the
Cotton decision, predicting a decision for March 2005. Communication from the
Appellate Body, WT/DS267/18, Dec. 16, 2004.
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or to other heavily subsidized agrarian markets such as the European
Union and Japan, Cotton could mandate a global shift in agricultural
production this decade. The ultimate precedent may guide a generation
of policy makers. To ask so much, the WTO should be sure to do so
with convincing legal reasoning that minimizes dissent. Indeed, if the
WTO is to encroach upon national sovereignty by striking down purely
domestic programs, it should do so fairly to protect its moral integrity.
The U.S. appeal affords the WTO Appellate Body an opportunity to
quiet critics of the original Panel decision. Although the WTO
anticipated this specific conflict for years, the Panel decision does not do
justice to the issues presented. If Cotton is upheld, challenging nations
may not be required to show the amount of economic damage that they
allegedly suffer by competing against subsidies. More importantly, the
Panel will be permitted to continue dismissing powerful, external
influences on the global marketplace in its causation analysis. By
eliminating a reasonable calculation of causation and damages, the WTO
Panel makes it too easy to prosecute a prima facie case, prejudicing the
procedure against subsidizing (usually developed) nations. In short, the
WTO Cotton Panel decision unilaterally convicts the U.S. of causing all
of Brazil's perceived woes while mandating compliance with a blank
check.
This Comment surveys four issues: 1) the international framework
that led to Cotton; 2) the legal reasoning of the initial WTO Panel; 3) the
U.S. strategy and suggestions for reversal or modifying the holding on
appeal; and 4) the ramifications Cotton will have if upheld. As the world
waits for the appellate decision only one thing is certain: more battles are
on the way.
II. Legal Backdrop of Cotton
Nations join the WTO to profit from the expansive international
market. In exchange for reciprocal trade benefits, WTO Members adhere
to agreements meant to lower quotas, subsidies, tariffs and other
measures that restrict free trading. For example, the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereinafter SCM Agreement or
SCM)4 outlines a complex plan for Members 5 to reduce subsidies.
Subsidies are direct or indirect payments from a government to any
enterprise whose promotion is considered to be in the public interest.6 In
the global marketplace, subsidies distort trade by artificially lowering
4. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement Annex 1A [hereinafter SCM Agreement or SCM].
5. WTO Member nations are referred to as "Members."
6. See SCM Agreement, supra note 4 at art. 1, for the technical definition.
[Vol. 24:1
SERIOUS PREJUDICE
market prices or increasing production and market share, giving the
subsidizing nation a non-market driven comparative advantage.
Controversial agricultural subsidies were exempted from the SCM
Agreement by negotiators and left within the jurisdiction of a separate
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (hereinafter Agriculture Agreement).7
Article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement, 8 known as the "Peace Clause,"
precluded Members from challenging perceived agricultural subsidies
under the SCM Agreement for nine years.9 On January 1, 2004 the
Peace Clause expired. On that date, Article 21.1 of the Agricultural
Agreement1° was triggered, exposing agricultural subsidies to the general
provisions of the SCM Agreement.
If a Member believes that its rights under any agreement are being
abridged by the actions of another Member, it may set into motion a
dispute resolution procedure.1 The WTO will provide an expert panel to
adjudicate the complaint. 12 The parties may appeal a panel decision, 13
but must conform to the Appellate Body's prescribed remedy or face
WTO authorized sanctions. 14  If necessary, those sanctions are to be
commensurate to the damages the aggrieved party suffers. 15
Brazil aggressively pursued the new opportunity, winning a Panel
ruling that certain U.S. cotton subsidy programs violate the SCM
Agreement. 16 Despite a year of deliberations, the decision is flawed in
two respects. The Panel neither required Brazil to quantify the damages
suffered, nor considered external variables affecting the global
marketplace. In effect, the Panel's decision unilaterally blames the U.S.
for all of Brazil's perceived woes and mandates U.S. compliance under
7. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 14, 1994, [WTO Agreement], Annex IA
[hereinafter Agriculture Agreement].
8. Id. at art. XIII. "During the implementation period.., domestic support
measures.., shall be ... non-actionable .. "
9. Id. at art. I(f). Signed in 1995, the exemption of agricultural subsidies from the
remedial provisions of the SCM Agreement lasted nine years-until 2004.
10. Agricultural Agreement, art. XXI(1) reads, "The provisions of GATT 1994 and
of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply
subject to the provisions of this Agreement." The SCM Agreement is an Annex IA
Agreement.
11. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, [WTO Agreement], Annex 2 [hereinafter DSU].
12. Id. at art. 2.
13. Id. at art. 17.1.
14. Id. at art. 22.
15. Id.
16. On May 19, 2003, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a Panel in
accordance with Article 6 of the DSU. The Panel, composed by the WTO Director-
General, consisted of Chairman Mr. Dariusz Rosati and members Mr. Mario Matus and
Mr. Daniel Moulis. Cotton, supra note 1, at 1.5-8. The Panel made its interim decision
on 26 April 26 2004, which was finalized on June 18, 2004.
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threat of unspecified sanctions.
III. The Panel Report: Serious Prejudice and the Fabric of Our Lives
Brazil alleges that U.S. subsidies cause artificial price suppression
in violation of Articles 5 and 6.3 of the SCM Agreement. 17  For a
challenging nation to prevail on this claim, a WTO panel must first find
that the challenged measures constitute subsidies within the definition of
SCM Agreement Articles 1 and 2,18 and then determine that those
subsidies cause "serious prejudice" per SCM Article 6.3. If the panel
finds serious prejudice, then SCM Article 5, which forbids Members
from causing "adverse effects" to other Members, has been violated. 19
The Article lists four scenarios where serious prejudice may be present
including, as Brazil claims here, when a subsidized product causes
significant price suppression in the same market for like products.2' The
U.S. counters by insisting it does not distort trade because its programs
are not directly linked to cotton production. The Cotton Panel sided with
Brazil, ruling that certain U.S. programs constitute subsidies that cause
serious prejudice to the Brazilian cotton industry. Their decision
provides a roadmap for challenging agricultural subsidies as SCM
Agreement violations.
17. Article 5 of the SCM Agreement lists three ways that an identified subsidy may
cause adverse effects that violate the SCM Agreement, including Article 5(c) "serious
prejudice to the interests of another Member." Article 6 elaborates "serious prejudice."
18. SCM Agreement, supra note 4, at arts. 1 and 2.
19. There is an explicit textual linkage between Article 5 and 6.3 of the SCM
Agreement. Article 5 states that, "No Member should cause, through the use of any
subsidy... adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.: (c) serious prejudice to
the interests of another Member." SCM Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 5 (emphasis
added). The chapeau of SCM Agreement, Article 6.3 also states that "[s]erious prejudice
in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise where one of the following [including
the elements in Article 6.3(c)] apply .... "
20. SCM Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 6.3:
Serious prejudice ... may arise in any case where one or several of the
following apply:
(a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like
product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member;
(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like
product of another Member from a third country market;
(c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the
subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of another
Member in the same market or significant price suppression, price
depression or lost sales in the same market;
(d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the
subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or
commodity as compared to the average share that it had during the
previous period of three years and this increase follows a particular trend
over a period where subsidies have been granted.
[Vol. 24:1
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A. Identifying the Challenged Measures
Brazil challenged a series of U.S. programs as joint and several
violations of the SCM Agreement. The challenged measures include
marketing loan payments, user-marketing ("Step-2") payments,
production flexibility contract payments and crop insurance payments.2
The specific characteristics of these four programs (discussed below) are
important because they will be analyzed twice: once to determine if they
fall within the SCM Agreement's subsidies definition, and again to
determine if the subsidies are actionable.
The Agricultural Act of 1949 is the statutory foundation for all of
the challenged programs.22 The Act provides the majority of U.S.
commodity price and farm income support. The U.S. Congress
periodically enacts omnibus farm bills that temporarily change the level
and design of the programs.2 3 Brazil challenged programs under the two
most recent farm bills, the Federal Agricultural Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR Act of 1996)24 and the Farm Security and
Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRI Act of 2002).25
The four different programs are supervised by the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).26 The first of these programs,
marketing loans, provide interim financing to prevent producers from
defaulting on farm loans.27 Rather than having farmers sell at harvest
time when crop prices are lowest, the interim loan enables producers to
store their harvested crop, collateral, and repay upon the sale when
market conditions are more favorable.28 The repayment due is the lower
of the world market price or the loan rate plus interest. If the world
market price is lower than the loan rate, the producer repays less than the
loan-the difference is a "marketing loan gain., 29 Thus, the marketing
loan program compensates producers for the difference between a low
world market price for their commodity and a guaranteed target price.
Second, Step-2 payments reward U.S. exporters for buying U.S.
21. Cotton, supra note 1, at 2.2. The characteristics of these programs will be
discussed in detail in this Comment.
22. Agricultural Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1435.
23. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.200-.201.
24. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 [hereinafter FAIR
Act of 1996].
25. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 [hereinafter FSRI Act of 2002].
26. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.202.
27. Marketing loan payments for cotton began in 1986 and have continued under
successive legislation, including the FAIR Act of 1996 and the FSRI Act of 2002. Id. at
7.203.
28. Cotton, supra note 1, at 2.204.
29. Id. at 7.207.
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cotton rather than cheaper foreign cotton.30  Like the marketing loan
payments, fund dispersal is based on the world price of cotton: if the U.S.
price exceeds the world price, U.S. businesses are refunded the extra cost
of buying the domestic cotton.3 1 The U.S. uses the A-Index, a cotton
industry benchmark, to represent the world market price in these loan
calculations.32
Third, production flexibility contract payments (hereinafter PFC
payments) distribute money to farmers according to the acres of cotton
planted in the past, regardless of what the farmer grows now.33 Unlike
the other three programs, this program was not extended by the FSRI Act
of 2002 and ended in September 2002. 34 It was intended to support
fanning certainty and flexibility while ensuring continued compliance
with farm conservation and wetland protection requirements.
35
Finally, federal crop insurance protects farmers against losses from
low crop yields and low market prices.36 The Federal Crop Insurance
Act grants the USDA Secretary authority to provide crop insurance, and
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), an agency within the
USDA, disperses the funding. 37 The producer pays part of the premium
while the FCIC pays the balance.38 The FCIC also reinsures the
insurance provider, covering most of the underwriting and administrative
costs.
Brazil used the preceding information to formulate complex
econometric models of the U.S. programs' effects upon the world cotton
market. The integrity of these models is vulnerable under the serious
prejudice analysis. This analysis determines if and to what extent an
identified subsidy is "actionable," i.e., sufficient for WTO remedial
action. Before the effect analysis, however, a preliminary inquiry is
required to determine if the programs fit the WTO definition of
"subsidies."
30. The user marketing (Step-2) program was authorized in 1990 and has been
renewed under successive legislation, including the FAIR Act of 1996 and the FSRI Act
of 2002. Id. at 7.209.
31. Id. at7.210.
32. The "A-Index" is an average of the five lowest price quotes of the principal
cottons traded in the world market calculated by Cotlook, a private UK-based
organization, available at http://www.cotlook.com.
33. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.212.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 7.212-.215.
36. See id. at 7.227.
37. Id. at 7.203.
38. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.227.
[Vol. 24:1
SERIOUS PREJUDICE
B. The Anatomy of a "Specific Subsidy ": The Threshold Inquiry for
Challenged Measures
The SCM Agreement's definitions and characterizations must be
used in any action pursued under the SCM Agreement. Thus, to be
actionable a challenged program must be a "subsidy" within the meaning
of SCM Article 1,39 and "specific" within SCM Article 2. 40 The Panel
concluded that all four of the U.S. agricultural programs that Brazil
challenged satisfied these definitions.
For a challenged measure to be a "subsidy" under SCM Article 1, it
must be a "financial contribution" that confers a "benefit., 41 The Panel
reasoned that grants made by a government agency constitute per s6
financial contributions, and confer a benefit "by placing the recipient in a
better position than the recipient otherwise would have been in the
marketplace. 42  The challenger need not quantify the amount of that
financial benefit but merely show it exists43 (while this decision is logical
for a preliminary inquiry it is improper when repeated later, during the
serious prejudice analysis).
The challenged program must also be "specific" within the meaning
of SCM Article 2 to be actionable.44 Subsidies statutorily granted to a
certain "enterprise," "industry," or group of enterprises or industries,
satisfy the specificity criteria.45  Brazil observed that none of the
challenged measures are widely available throughout the U.S. economy.
On the contrary, many of these programs are not even available through
39. Article 1 of the SCM Agreement provides, in part, that:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall bedeemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body
within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as
"government"), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g.
grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds
or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); ... and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
40. SCM Agreement, Article 2 reads in part:
In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1,
is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries...
within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles shall
apply:
(a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the
granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain
enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific....
41. Id.
42. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1116.
43. Id. at 7.1119.
44. SCM Agreement, supra note 43, art. 2.
45. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1138.
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the agricultural sector.46  Thus, the programs target only some
enterprises. The U.S. did not contest this specificity allegation except as
it concerned crop insurance, which the U.S. claims is available to the
entire agricultural sector.4 7 The Panel rejected the U.S. stipulation,
stating only that "specificity is a general concept and the breadth or
narrowness of specificity is not susceptible to rigid quantitative
definition. 4 8  This convoluted statement demonstrates the WTO's
willingness to broadly construe the definition of "specific" for the
purpose of initiating a subsidy challenge. The Panel concluded that all of
the challenged subsidies meet the specificity requirement.49
Thus, a challenging nation must satisfy minimal threshold standards
to characterize a measure as a subsidy. Whether a subsidy proves to be
actionable requires further inquiry. Part III of the SCM Agreement ° lays
out the standards for identifying and remedying actionable subsidies
once subsidies have been confirmed.
C. Serious Prejudice and The Panel's Approach to Significant Price
Suppression in the Same Market
Brazil asserts the subsidized U.S. market generates excess cotton
which depresses cotton prices in the international market.51 Brazil has
submitted complex econometric models as evidence of the U.S.
programs' effects.52 If "significant price suppression," within the
meaning of SCM Article 6.3(c), 53 is shown, then SCM Article 5 has been
violated.54 Violators must remove the adverse effects or face sanctions.
"Price suppression" requires an examination of "price," so first the
market and market price must be identified. The unspecified "market"
for the purposes of Article 6.3(c) includes the "world market., 55 Brazil
chose the A-Index, while the U.S. contended that it merely provides a
"price quote." The Panel provided four reasons the A-Index is a
46. Id. at 7.1122.
47. Id. at 7.1123.
48. Id. at7.1142.
49. Id. at7.1154-.1155.
50. Part III includes Articles 5 (Adverse Effects), 6 (Serious Prejudice) and 7
(Remedies).
51. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1334.
52. This is to Brazil's credit, and the veracity of these calculations should be
evaluated by the Panel and used to identify an approximate damages that U.S. subsidies
cause Brazilian interests. However, the Panel holds the U.S. responsible without
identifying such a sum.
53. SCM Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 5.
54. SCM Agreement, supra note 4, at arts. 1 and 2.
55. Id. at 7.1240.
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legitimate world market price56 including, most importantly, that the U.S.
government relies on the A-Index to determine whether its market
condition-contingent subsidies (i.e. marketing loan and Step-2 payments)
will be paid.57
Next, "suppression" exists where prices artificially are prevented
from rising, did not rise as much as they should have, or declined.58
Here, Brazil alleged cotton prices are prevented from rising. Further, the
only prior WTO Panel that examined the meaning of "significant"
observed that, "the inclusion of this qualifier in Article 6.3(c) presumably
was intended to ensure that margins of undercutting so small that they
could not meaningfully affect suppliers ... are not considered to give
rise to serious prejudice. 59  The Cotton Panel defined the effects of
"significant price suppression" as "important, notable or
consequential., 60  They identified three relevant considerations to this
inquiry: (1) the relative magnitude of U.S. production and exports in the
world cotton market; (2) general price trends in the market for the
subsidized product; and (3) the nature of the challenged subsidies.61
In the "magnitude" and "general price trend" inquiries the Panel
appears to have reduced the separate Article 6.3(d) serious prejudice
standard into a factor of the Article 6.3(c) analysis. 62  Indeed, Brazil
brought a separate Article 6.3(d) complaint alleging the U.S. has an
unfair share of the world market.63 That complaint failed. The Panel
did, however, consider Brazil's econometric evidence and note the
"magnitude" of U.S. exports in their Article 6.3(c) analysis. The Panel
noted that the U.S. is the world's top cotton exporter, and its control of
the world market increased from 23.5 percent in 1999 to 40 percent in
2002.64 There was a broad decline in overall A-Index cotton price trends
56. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1265-.1270.
57. Id. at 7.1270.
58. Id. at 7.1277.
59. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1321 (referring to Indonesia-Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry, 23 Jul. 1998, WT/DS54/R).
60. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1325.
61. The Cotton Panel ruled, "[g]iven the relative magnitude of United States
production and exports, the overall price trends we identified in the world market, and the
nature of the.., subsidies in question.., we are not, by any means looking at an
insignificant or unimportant world price phenomenon." Id. at 7.1332.
62. Article 6.3(d) provides a separate actionable subsidy standard, if it can be
proven:
(d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the
subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity
as compared to the average share that it had during the previous period of three
years and this increase follows a particular trend over a period where subsidies
have been granted.
63. Cotton, supra note 1, at 8. 1(ii).
64. Id. at 7.1283.
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from 1996 through early 2002, indicating that prices may have been
artificially depressed since they temporally correlate to the U.S. subsidies
and increasing market share.65 In 2002 the trend reverses, perhaps
indicating the price suppression leveled off or ended.66 Yet, the Panel
decided that these trends, while factors, are inconclusive for a
determination of price suppression.67
The Panel's damning consideration regarded the "nature" of the
challenged subsidies. They determined that there are two general types
of U.S. subsidies: those that are directly price-contingent (i.e., funding is
provided in proportion to the current market value of cotton) and those
that are not.68 Directly price-contingent subsidies, such as marketing
loan and Step-2 payments,69 are actionable.7° If producers repay
marketing loans at less than the loan rate, this financial contribution
supplements the income of the producer. 7' The greater the difference
between the world price of cotton and the marketing loan rate, the greater
the subsidy payment will be. Step-2 payments are also price-contingent,
basing dispersal upon the relationship between domestic and A-Index
world prices. 72  Thus, these price-contingent programs insulate U.S.
production from the effects of the global market.
The Panel found the second group of subsidies, such as PFC
payments and Federal Crop Insurance, 73 are not price-contingent and
therefore not actionable under the SCM Agreement.74 By not inducing
farmers to produce cotton specifically, these so-called "decoupled"
payments do not artificially bloat production or cause significant price
suppression. The Panel characterized these programs as mere "income
support., 75 Thus, world price-contingency is the difference between an
actionable and non-actionable subsidy.
In short, the Panel decided that two of the four U.S. programs
involve SCM Article 6.3 "significant price suppression," causing
65. Id. at 7.1351-.1352.
66. Id. at 7.1288.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 7.1289.
69. Id. at 7.1290.
70. Id. at 7.1308.
71. Id. at 7.1291.
72. Id. at 7.1304.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 7.1307. The Panel stated:
These subsidies are of a different nature, and thus effect, than the other (price-
contingent) subsidies we have examined above. Because they are of a different
nature and effect, we decline to aggregate them and their effects with those of
the mandatory price-contingent subsidies in our price suppression analysis here.
Rather, we must consider them separately.
75. Id.
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"serious prejudice" to the interests of Brazil and violating the SCM
76Agreement. Yet, in making this determination the Panel dismissed
several evidentiary submissions the U.S. believes are crucial to a
legitimate serious prejudice finding based on econometric models.
D. Causation, Calculations and Controversy
Most controversially, the Panel acknowledged that other factors
may have affected prices in the world market over this time period, but
dismissed them and effectively decided that a sole causal link exists
between the U.S. price-contingent subsidies and the significant price
suppression.77 The U.S. insists that at the most it is only a partial, not
primary factor of Brazil's woes. The U.S. will resubmit these
independent variables and insist that they be weighed appropriately on
appeal.
The Panel also decided it is unnecessary to calculate the precise
amount of the actionable subsidies in question,78 holding that the text of
the SCM Agreement contains no quantification requirement. The Panel
hedged their conclusion, however, by noting that "a very large amount"
of this information is available in the record.79 For the U.S. to decide
whether to comply with the Panel ruling and drop the subsidies or defy
the WTO and face trade sanctions, the U.S. needs to know what the
potential sanctions will be. The WTO Panel should provide the U.S. at
least an approximate figure.
Brazil is not to blame for this failure to communicate. Brazil
provided complex econometric calculations utilizing USDA information,
calculating a total of $12.9 billion of U.S. agricultural subsidies from
1999-2002.80 The Agriculture Agreement caps WTO Members' annual
legal subsidy ceilings at 1992 levels: 8' approximately $1.6 billion dollars
for U.S. cotton.82 Brazil estimates that without the excess subsidies U.S.
cotton production would have fallen 29 percent, while exports would
have decreased 41 percent.83 Brazil projects these events would have led
to a 12.6 percent rise in international cotton prices,84 benefiting their
76. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1395.
77. Id. at 7.1355-.1361.
78. Id. at 7.1297, 7.1349.
79. Id. at 7.1349.
80. Id. at 7.1335.
81. Agriculture Agreement, art. 13(b)(ii). This amount is permitted beyond the
Peace period, notwithstanding the SCM Agreement.
82. Carmen Gentile, Analysis: Brazil Wins Round One on Cotton, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2004, available at http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040428-043535-
4238r.htm (last visited June 7, 2005).
83. See id.
84. Id.
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producers. More specifically, Brazil estimates that $600 million in sales
were lost during the 2001 marketing season alone.85 This is exactly the
approximate type of sum figure that the WTO Panel should publish in the
interest of fairness.
86
Without a fair calculation of the direct effect of U.S. subsidies, the
U.S. could be held responsible for more than its fair share of the
perceived harm to Brazilian merchants. Furthermore, without publishing
this figure, the U.S. will not be able to rationally develop its political
response. The U.S. is currently appealing the Panel decision. The U.S.'s
econometric models will be the basis of the American appeal.
IV. The United States' Cotton Appeal
Shortly after the Cotton decision, U.S. Trade Representative 7
(USTR) Robert B. Zoellick 88 characterized the Panel's verdict as
"mixed" and expressed optimism about the appeal.89 He commended
certain aspects of the decision: that no causal link exists with respect to
the non-world price contingent subsidies (i.e., PFC payments and crop
insurance) and that the Panel refused to find that U.S. subsidies caused
"future serious prejudice" to Brazil's interests from 2003-2007, even
though several programs have been authorized through 2007 by the FSRI
Act of 2002.90 Clearly the decision assumes that the U.S. will comply
and remove the subsidies. On October 18, 2004, the U.S. delegation
alerted the WTO Membership of their official decision to appeal.91 The
U.S. will provide the WTO Appellate Body with information in an
attempt to reverse, change, or modify Cotton in some way.
While WTO dispute settlement proceedings are confidential,92 the
U.S. publicized the statistical evidence it will use to appeal the WTO
85. Andrew Hay, Brazil Wins WTO Cotton Ruling, Swissinfo, Apr. 27, 2004,
available at http://www.swissinfo.org/sen/Swissinfo.html?siteSect=1438sid=4896435
(last visited May 30, 2005).
86. Of course, the Panel should also weigh the $600 million dollar figure against the
factors external to the U.S. subsidies.
87. The USTR is part of the Executive Office of the President and advises the
President on trade policy. The U.S. Trade Act of 1974 grants the President (and
therefore, the USTR) broad discretion in formulating trade policy.
88. Robert Zoellick was appointed Deputy Secretary of State under Condoleezza
Rice on January 7, 2005. His successor at the USTR, Ambassador Rob Portman, was
sworn in on April 29, 2005.
89. See WTO Panel Issues Mixed Verdict in Cotton Case, Office of the United States
Trade Representative, Sept. 8, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2004/September/WTOPanelIssuesMixedVerdict
inCottonCase.html (last visited May 30, 2005).
90. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1501-03.
91. Appeal is a right pursuant to Article 16 of the DSU. DSU, supra note 11, at art.
16.
92. DSU, supra note 11, at art. 14.
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Panel decision.93 For example, the U.S. will challenge the findings that it
is guilty of significant price suppression and that a challenger need not
demonstrate the amount of damages from the challenged subsidies.9 4
The U.S. will employ several independent econometric models to show
other factors contributed to the lost market access suffered by Brazil.95
Additionally, the U.S. will present a defense based on the textual
interpretation of the SCM Agreement.
A. Independent Studies
The U.S. will challenge the Panel decision that Brazil need not
demonstrate the amount of the challenged subsidies and attack Brazil's
econometric models. Hoping the Appellate Body will decide that such
calculations are essential to the serious prejudice inquiry, the U.S. will
present independent calculations showing Brazil's numbers are
exaggerated. Brazil asserted that world cotton prices would have risen
12.6 percent in lieu of American subsidies from 1999-2002.96 Three
recent independent studies from varied sources indicate otherwise. First,
Texas Tech University's econometric models concluded that removal of
the U.S. programs would result in a world price decrease of less than 1
percent.97  Second, the United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization estimated that removal of all cotton subsidies worldwide,
including high subsidies in the E.U. and Japan, would result in just a 3.1
percent increase in world cotton prices." Third, a 2003 IMF study99
concluded that elimination of U.S. programs would only result in a 2
percent change in world cotton prices.'00 How these studies are weighted
against Brazil's models by the Appellate Body may make or break the
U.S. presentation.
93. See Dispelling Myths About U.S. Support to Cotton Farmers: U.S. Programs
Have Not Caused Low Cotton Prices and Hurt Foreign Growers, USTR, Sept. 8, 2004,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/FacLSheets/2004/asset
upload file784_6153.pdf (last visited June 7, 2005)[hereinafter USTR].
94. Notification of Appeal by the United States, WTO/DS267/17, Oct. 20, 2004.
95. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1355.
96. Id. at7.1355.
97. World Cotton Model by the Cotton Economics Research Institute (CERI) at
Texas Tech University, available at http://www.ceri.ttu.edu/policy/publications/
presentations/new%20report.pdf (last visited May 30, 2005).
98. In the FAO model, the U.S. programs accounted for two-thirds of the payment
modeled, and would therefore alone result in only a two percent difference on world
cotton prices. USTR, supra note 98, at 3.
99. International Monetary Fund.
100. USTR, supra note 98, at 3.
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B. Mitigating Evidence
The initial Panel rejected arguments that other factors were
responsible for Brazil's perceived woes. 10' The U.S. hopes the legal
conclusion that it causes serious prejudice will be overturned or
mitigated. The U.S. will re-offer these arguments, among others, 10 2 in an
attempt to prove to the Appellate Body that U.S. subsidies are only a
partial, not primary, factor for any harm suffered by Brazil.
First, the U.S. asserts that the disposition of U.S. cotton production
has shifted from domestic mills to export markets in recent years, placing
more U.S. cotton on the export market.' 0 3  This is because the U.S.
percentage of world consumption declined between 2001 and 2004,
allowing U.S. exports to increase while U.S. production remained stable,
hovering around 20 percent of the world supply between 1999-2001.4
The U.S. also posits that demand for new, competing low-priced
synthetic fibers may also account for increased U.S. exports. 0 5
Second, the U.S. asserts its programs have not insulated domestic
farmers from market forces, because U.S. cotton acreage increases and
decreases in proportion to the rest of the world. According to the USTR
statistics, U.S. producers plant cotton commensurately with producers in
the rest of the world.10 6  In marketing year 2002-2003, U.S. farmers
actually decreased their acreage while foreign production increased.
10 7
The U.S. insists this would not have been possible if the U.S. were
insulated from world price movements.
Third, the U.S. asserts that world consumption fluctuated when
China released millions of bales of government cotton supplies between
1999 and 2001.108 China is the largest producer and user of raw cotton in
the world, 109 and USTR statistics show an undeniable correlation
101. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1355-.1361.
102. A National Cotton Council (NCC) representative stated that:
a more decoupled U.S. cotton program, a lower loan rate, a lower target price, a
stable world market share, an unbiased economic study showing minimal price
impacts and Brazil's own dramatic increase in cotton production all point to a
U.S. cotton program that is not causing serious prejudice to Brazil, or any other
country in the world.
NCC Disagrees With Brazil/U.S. Dispute Panel's Decision, available at
http://www.cotton.org/news/releases/2004/brazil-public.cfin (last visited June 7, 2005).
103. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1361.
104. USTR, supra note 98, at 4.
105. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1358. USTR, supra note 98. The U.S. is relying on
the Texas Tech University study for these figures, supra note 95.
106. USTR, supra note 98, at 6-7.
107. Id.
108. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1361. USTR, supra note 98, at 3.
109. Id.
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between Chinese net cotton imports and the A-Index. 10 For the past
fourteen years the world price of cotton has paralleled the metric tonnage
imported by China."' Generally, when China increases imports or
decreases exports, cotton prices go up; conversely, when China decreases
imports or increases exports, cotton prices fall. l l 2  From 1999-2001,
China exported cotton. The original Panel rejected this contention
because the Chinese exports were "smaller in magnitude" than the U.S.
exports over the same period." 3
If the Appellate Body affirms that Brazil is suffering serious
prejudice, the U.S. hopes this evidence will help attenuate Brazil's plight
from the U.S. subsidies.
C. The Discretionary Interpretation of Serious Prejudice
The U.S. will also present a textual defense. Even if the U.S. is
committing serious prejudice the finding alone may not be enough to
hold the U.S. fimancially responsible. The use of "may" in the
introductory sentence of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement indicates that
serious prejudice may not exist even if the circumstances listed in Article
6.3 are found. 114 The "may" in SCM Article 6.3 contrasts with the
"shall" in SCM Article 6.1."' Statutory drafters show their intent by
using language consistently within a document. Thus, the drafters
intended the Panel to have broad discretion in determining serious
prejudice by using "may." However, the Panel rejected this argument,
noting that there are no additional criteria found in Article 5 or 6 of the
SCM Agreement. 1 6 The Panel once again hedged its opinion by saying,
"In any event, even assuming arguendo that any sort of additional
demonstration is necessary ... we believe that Brazil has also fulfilled
that burden."' '17  In conjunction with the mitigating factors and
independent studies discussed before, the U.S. may be able to
demonstrate that the burden of proof needed by Brazil to prevail has not
been met. Thus, even though serious prejudice may be present, causation
is unclear.
110. USTR, supra note 98, at 3.
111. A-Index Northern Europe, available at http://www.cotlook.com/information/
cotlookindices.php (last visited May 30, 2005).
112. USTR, supra note 98, at 4.
113. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1361.
114. Cotton, supra note 1, at 1377.
115. SCM Agreement, supra note 4. Article 6.1 reads, "Serious prejudice in the sense
of paragraph (c) of Article 5 shall be deemed to exist in the case of..." (emphasis
added).
116. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1372.
117. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1391.
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V. Potential Policy Ramifications of the Cotton Decision
"This is a precedent; this is a war that must continue," a Brazilian
lawyer cheered after learning of the Cotton decision."l 8  Meanwhile,
White House spokesman Scott McClellan said, "[w]e will be defending
U.S. agricultural interests in every form we need to, and have no
intention of unilaterally taking steps to disarm when it comes to this."'"19
Despite the rhetoric, the U.S. may compound the Cotton fallout if they
chose defiance. President Bush recently chose to remove steel subsidies
to avoid suffering more severe trade penalties.
120
The WTO Appellate Body may uphold, modify, or reverse the legal
findings and conclusions of the Panel. 12 1 If the Appellate Body reverses
the Panel decision, the American agricultural programs will continue
unabated. If Cotton is upheld, the implications for the U.S., E.U., Japan
and other agricultural subsidizers will be significant. Although some
modification is likely due to the sheer size of the Panel decision,122 some
of the following scenarios might play out:
1) The United States can comply. American farmers benefit from
$19 billion dollars in annual subsidies. 123 Weaning them off may shut
down many farms, especially smaller ones. Less federal support would
also likely reduce the acreage that remaining U.S. farmers plant. Some
cotton acreage may shift to other crops such as com or soybeans, but in
some areas there is no alternative to planting cotton.124 Furthermore, the
clear danger is that other U.S. crop programs may be challenged,
including those for wheat, rice, feed grains, and soybeans. Following
Cotton, each of these commodity sectors (which are subsidized under the
same legislation as cotton), will tumble like dominoes. American
farmers rightly fear for their livelihood. On the other hand, some free
trade economists argue that subsidies are never in the best interests of
America and that the WTO is providing the U.S. an opportunity to
remove this sector from the government dole. 25
118. Elizabeth Becker, WTO Rules Against U.S. on Cotton Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2004, late ed., at AI [hereinafter Becker].
119. Jeffrey Sparshott, U.S. Shies From WTO Cotton Ruling, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2004, available at http://wwww.washtimes.com/business/20040427-092747-2629r.htm
(last visited May 30, 2005) [hereinafter Sparshott].
120. Becker, supra note 118.
121. DSU, supra note 11, at art. 17.13.
122. The Cotton Panel decision is 351 pages long. See Cotton, supra note 1.
123. Becker, supra note 118.
124. Harry Baumes, Implications of WTO Ruling on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, Global
Insight, available at http://www.globalinsight.com/Perspective/PerspectiveDetail928.htm
(last visited May 30, 2005).
125. See generally ECONOMIST. See also John Baffes, The "Cotton Problem,"
available at http://www.fao.org/es/esc/common/ecg/47647-en-CottonProblem_
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2) The U.S. may refuse to comply. This would cause the WTO to
authorize Brazil to deny the U.S. equivalent trade access,1 26 making the
lack of a calculation of damages significant. Policy makers cannot make
an informed decision when they lack key facts, i.e., the amount of trade
sanctions they risk. Further, although Brazil's sanctions for cotton
subsidies may not be large vis-t-vis American interests, it could easily be
compounded. Other nations with cotton economies will challenge the
U.S. to claim their "piece of the action." If Brazil wins the precedent and
cotton statistics will be readily available, 27 other commodity sectors will
be challenged. Thus, American farmers rightly fear being squeezed out
of the market by the low cost of labor in developing countries.
Agriculture is a powerful interest group in the U.S., and it will surely
invest political capital in representatives who protect their jobs, no matter
the cost. 128
3) In either event, the U.S. can retaliate. The U.S. has powerful
weapons of economic warfare immediately at its disposal. For example,
the U.S. grants a Generalized System of Preferences, or "GSP"
privileges, to many developing nations. It can deny these privileges to
Brazil or other challengers for a variety of reasons.12 9 Although Brazil is
eligible for GSP benefits, 3 ° it is also on the USTR's 2004 Special 301
Watch List for being a leading worldwide violator of intellectual
property rights. 13 1 As the U.S. economy shifts from exporting agriculture
Baffes.pdf (last visited May 30, 2005).
126. The amount is probably in the range of $600 million dollars annually, per the
Brazilian estimate of lost sales.
127. Cotton, supra note 1, at 7.1396. Brazil asserted that other WTO Members, in
particular African cotton-producers, suffer serious prejudice as a result of the U.S.
subsidies. The text of Article 7.2 of the SCM Agreement makes it clear that the remedies
available in Article 7 of the SCM Agreement may only be invoked by a Member itself.
Thus, the WTO Panel only considers serious prejudice experienced by the complaining
Member.
128. The National Cotton Council (NCC) is the central organization of the U.S. cotton
industry and a strong advocate of the U.S. appeal. Its members include producers,
ginners, oilseed crushers, merchants, cooperatives, warehousemen, and textile
manufacturers. NCC representatives often testify before Congress. See, e.g.,
http://www.cotton.org/gov/testimony/trade-testimony.cfm (last visited May 30, 2005).
129. The GSP promotes exports of manufactured goods from developing countries to
help free the countries from heavy dependence on trade. Through a series of unilateral
duty-free trade preferences, developed countries lower the duties they assess on goods
imported from developing countries, helping the latter mitigate the high cost of
investment in new industries. Each developed nation is free to determine the nature and
scope of the concessions it grants. In the U.S., broad discretionary authority is granted to
the President under the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.
130. U.S. Generalized System of Preferences Guidebook, 19, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeDevelopment/referencePrograms/GSP/asset upload-
file333_5430.pdf (last visited May 30, 2005).
131. USTR, 2004 Special 301 Report Executive Summary, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2004/2004-Special.
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and manufactured products to exporting culture and technology,
intellectual property is the key U.S. sector for economic growth and
must be respected. If it chooses this course of action, the U.S. should
differentiate between the intellectual property and the agricultural issues.
If it appears that Brazil is being denied benefits in response to Cotton, it
may incite anti-Americanism within the WTO and trade circles. Policy
makers should appear to act in good faith because a more conciliatory
tone will be prudent in the long run. On the other hand, the U.S. should
not reward those who attack its interests and there are separate,
independent grounds to deny Brazil GSP privileges.
4) Finally, the U.S. can seek a separate peace through bilateral or
multilateral negotiations. A compromise through trade talks could be
much less painful for the U.S. than either strict compliance or defiance.
Agriculture is a major topic at the current Doha Round of trade
negotiations, 32 which will set trade policy for a generation. The U.S. is
standing shoulder to shoulder with the E.U. and Japan on this issue.
Each provides extensive agricultural support. U.S. trade negotiators have
asked developing nations, including Brazil, to open their markets to more
U.S. industrial products in return for lower agricultural subsidies,'
33
better market access, and help in meeting international production
standards. 134  Cotton makes the U.S. bargaining position weaker.
Developing nations emboldened by this ruling will demand more for
permitting U.S. subsidies to continue and offer fewer concessions. The
trickle-down effect could sidetrack plans for a hemispheric free trade
bloc and other initiatives. 135 The U.S. has recently entered into a Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 136 a free trade agreement
301/assetLuploadfile 16_5995.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). "Special 301" requires the
USTR to identify countries that deny effective protection for U.S. intellectual property
rights. Countries that offer the least protection for relevant U.S. products are designated
"Priority Foreign Countries" and risk trade sanctions. Other lists do not incur immediate
sanctions, including the "Priority Watch" and "Watch List."
132. The conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the mandate for negotiations on a range
of subjects and other work involving all aspects of the WTO's jurisdiction. Brazil is
aware of its new leverage in the Doha Round negotiations. See Cl6vis Rossi, Brasil Tern
Vit6ria na OMC Contra os EUA, available at http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/
folha/dinheiro/ult9lu83494.shtml (last visited May 30, 2005).
133. Delivering on Doha's Promise: 2005 Will Be a Vital Year for Free-Trade Talks,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 2005.
134. Sparshott, supra note 118.
135. Co-chaired by Brazil, the proposed 34-nation Free Trade Area of the Americas
would lower trade barriers for every nation in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba.
136. Free Trade with Central America: Summary of the U.S.-Central America Free
Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 2003, available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
FactSheets/2003/FreeTradewithCentral_AmericaSummary.of theU.S.-
CentralAmerica_-FreeTrade-Agreement.html (last visited June 7, 2005).
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with Chile,' 37 and is aggressively pursuing talks with other Andean
nations. Thus, nearly all U.S. trade relations will be affected by the
ultimate Cotton decision.
VI. Conclusion
U.S. Senator Kent Conrad lamented that Cotton "has potential to
have extraordinary consequences up and down every main street in rural
America."' 138 As it stands, the evidence needed to condemn a subsidizing
nation is minimal and circumstantial. Cotton ignores externalities
affecting the global marketplace and avoids a calculation of damages.
If, as likely, the overall decision is upheld and the U.S. programs
fall, the WTO needs to strengthen its legal reasoning. By demanding a
more complete evidentiary calculation, the WTO can ensure that a single
nation does not shoulder responsibility for every anomaly in the complex
international marketplace. Informing the subsidizer of this
approximation will also enable the nation to rationally consider its
options. Further, the WTO should take great care to resolve this crisis
amiably so as to not distort its present and future role on the world stage.
The standards that emerge from the Cotton Appeal may dictate the future
of international agriculture, the WTO, and international trade for
generations to come.
139
137. Free Trade With Chile: Summary of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/FactSheets/2002/
FreeTradewith_ChileSummary_oftheU.S._Chile_Free_TradeAgreement.html
(last visited June 7, 2005).
138. Elizabeth Becker, Lawmakers Voice Doom and Gloom on WTO Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at C1.
139. The WTO Appellate Body has considered the issue longer than expected and
predicts its ultimate decision will be made in 2005. United States-Subsidies on Upland
Cotton. Communication from the Appellate Body, Dec. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.docsonline.wto.org.
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